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The phenomenon of poverty was felt and observed more during the decade of 
1990s, as the overall growth slowed down.  While the slowed economic growth and 
recessionary trends contributed to poverty, the trickle “down effect” once thought, to 
improve living conditions, did not reach the lowest level owing largely to lack of 
accessibility of institutions, unjust and non-poor policies.  For these reasons, in 
Pakistan during the decades of 60s and 80s, when the country experienced high 
growth rates of 6-7 percent, 34 percent of people still lived below the poverty line. 
Socio-economic development, improving the quality of life in general and of 
rural poor in particular, welfare have been the prime stated goals of government.  
Therefore, rural development programmes, such as, Village-Aid, Integrated Rural 
Development Programme (IRDP), Peoples Works Programme, Tameer-e-watan 
Programme, Prime Minister’s Five Points Programme etc. were introduced to 
improve farm productivity, which would consequently improve incomes and quality 
of life of rural poor.  This was done through the Department of Local Government 
and Rural Development.  Little impact on the life of the rural poor, however, was 
observed partly because these were administered through closed, immutable and 
cloistered institutions of government which are not accessible and responsive to the 
needs of poor.  Also, the lack of focus on community participation and need for it 
was evident. As these programmes were managed through government departments 
these lacked flexibility and out-reach.  The approach of administering was fixed, 
rigid and lacked professionalism.   
There was then the experience of executing programmes for the poor by Non 
Government Organisation (NGO).  There are arguments in favour and against NGOs, 
as some of these brought bad names to those doing good work.  However, some of 
the known NGOs, contributing significantly to improvement in quality of life of poor 
were the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP), Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) 
within the country.  Though the operation remained localised.  The main philosophy 
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of these programmes was social mobilisation of community and identification and 
execution of projects by the community.  These NGOs mobilised community 
resources to develop self-confidence, self-reliance and collective efforts of the 
people. 
In early 1980s the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, showed remarkable results 
of providing micro-credit to the poor and helping to build their self esteem by 
enabling to start small businesses in which poor had skills and experience.  The 
operations of Grameen Bank have spread gradually through out Bangladesh, 
benefiting 700,000 borrowers.  Its experience has been fairly successful [Yunus 
(1999) and Yaron (1994)]. 
The necessary condition for poverty alleviation programmes to have effective 
long term impact on income, employment and productivity; is improvement in 
redistributive economic growth, improvement in social services for poor and 
opportunities for them to develop their full potential [Streeten and Burki (1978)].   
Without improvement in these areas, poverty alleviation interventions will barely 
keep people afloat the poverty line.   In these conditions, if poverty intervention 
should sustain, then the capital requirement for running the operations of micro-
credit programmes need to be made available at subsidised rates (perhaps by the 
donors).  This was true for micro-credit programmes of Grameen Bank (GB), 
Bangladesh Badan Kredit Kecamaten (BKK) Programme, Indonesia, and AKRSP 
[Riedinger (1994)].  However, as acquiring capital from the donor is becoming 
scarce, these programmes will have to  look for alternatives to improving self-sustain 
ability.   
Micro-credit Programmes internationally are being debated on three aspects 
[Sinha (1998)].  These are: (a) targeting the poor: that is, what percentage of micro-
credit financing members constitute poor? (b) sustainability which relates to the 
ability of these programmes to continue to lend money to more and more poor (c) 
and impact of programme in terms of such indicators as improvement in income.  In 
all micro credit programmes, measuring impact of the programme has been difficult 
because it takes about 8-10 year to see the impact of the programme.  If outreach of 
the Programme is taken as its success, then micro credit programmes have limited 
outreach.  GB has been able to reach only 17-18 percent of target poor in its over 20 
years of operation. 
Programme impact, however, has been mainly measured in terms of recovery 
rate and out reach of the programme.  The outreach of the programme counts the 
number of loanees in which the repeat loans are not segregated.  
The high cost of operations of micro-credit programme and declining 
subsidies are being debated.  It has been observed that decline in subsidies have 
come as a result of: (i) high repayment rates achieved by poor borrowers in the early 
years, inspite of borrowing at near market rates of interests along with; (ii) inability 
to convincingly establish that a dollar spent on targeted credit has a greater impact on 
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poverty than a dollar spent on alternative policies [Van de Walle (1997)].  The latter 
argument is extremely important because money spent on social and physical 
infrastructure, with pro-poor bias, has larger outreach, as compared to micro-credit. 
In mid nineties, in Pakistan, National Rural Support Programme (NRSP) was 
initiated followed by Regional Rural Support Programme. These Programmes, 
largely applied the philosophy of Grameen Bank, AKRSP and OPP.  Punjab Rural 
Support Programme was created in 1998 and started its operation in 8 regions of 
Punjab.  These Programmes were two pronged, that is, provision of micro credit and 
social mobilisation of poor. 
Social mobilisation aspect of the programme comprise mobilisation of 
communities at the village level to form community organisation (CO).  The 
community organisation identifies collective and individual needs.  The CO serves as 
pivotal point in bringing people together, share experience and improve living 
collectively.  It decides about collective and individual loans, needs and collects 
savings regularly. 
 The paper aims to define micro credit and analyse micro-credit programme of 
Punjab Rural Support Programme (PRSP) in terms of extent of targeting the poor, 
types of loans given to target client and impact of one-time micro credit on the 
incomes of poor.  For this purpose a survey was undertaken to assess improvement in 
incomes, as a result of credit.  It also attempts to analyse operational cost of credit 
disbursement to determine self-sustainability and outreach of the programme. 
The assumptions are that Rural Support Programme (RSP) serve the needs of 
‘poor’ to certain extent.  However, the “real poor” are not brought fullest in the fold 
of the programme.  It is in the design of these programmes that these cannot give full 
coverage to “real poor”.  These programmes provide an additional and alternative 
source  (other source of loans are from shopkeepers, big landlords etc.) to acquire 
loan for economic activity only.  Other loans may be used for meeting consumption 
needs. 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Interest of academia and practitioners in micro-credit as an instrument in 
poverty reduction, is a recent phenomenon.  There was a perception that poor 
represent high credit risk because they lack collateral and are unable to invest in 
gainful economic activity.  It was also presumed that poor utilised credit on 
consumption, such as marriage, death etc.  While this may be true for loans for 
consumption smoothing acquired from rural shopkeepers etc. [Nazli (2001)], the 
RSP’s loans are meant exclusively for economic activity.   
The perception that poor cannot invest in gainful economic activity gave way, 
when in late 70s Grameen Bank was created and its micro-credit operations along 
with social mobilisation programme, showed that poor have more credit worthiness 
and they can generate surplus which enables poor to stay out of poverty.  This 
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programme also demonstrated that poor can borrow at near market rates and repay 
these loans in time.   Subsidised rural credit during 1960s and 1970s were presumed 
to facilitate rural development, however, did not achieve expected results.  Highly 
subsidised money did not reach the small farmers and landless for whom the credit 
was meant.  By and large it went to big farmers.  An apparently pro-poor policy was 
misdirected [Adams and Graham (1981)].  Micro-credit programmes were thus a 
response to these misdirected policies.  These programme in different countries were 
funneled through autonomous bodies or NGOs. 
The review of literature of last decade (1990s), on micro credit has focused on 
the financial sustainability, i.e., whether these programmes are able to cover both 
financial and operational costs (without regard to social and political changes these 
programmes bring in).  The studies do not show if cost effectiveness can be achieved 
by reducing administrative cost and by introducing economies of scales in operations 
[McNamara and Morse (1998)].  Studies have shown that micro credit as an 
instrument of policy alleviation has been successful, however, its outreach has been 
limited because of its lack of self-sustainability [Stiglitz (1990); Yunus (1999) and 
McNamara and Morse (1998)]. 
According to studies, sustainability depends on interest rate charged and the 
rate of repayment.  Studies have also shown that self-sustainability, if achieved can 
result in increased outreach of programme [Yaron (1992); Yaron (1994)].  There are 
concerns, however, whether the scarce money from donors be spent on providing 
micro credit or invested in crucial sectors like agriculture, infrastructure, health, 
education which have long term benefits in improving incomes and welfare [Sinha 
(1998)].   
One further finds in the literature on rural micro credit, that in order to reduce 
the risk of non repayment by the poor and reduce transaction cost, ‘peer’ monitoring is 
the most effective method [Stiglitz (1990)].  This will target the poor and misdirection 
of subsidised credit will be avoided to a certain extent.  Peer monitoring, in fact has 
met two objectives successfully.  One the loanee is known in person to group (as in the 
case of loans from rural shopkeeper, who knows almost everybody in the community).  
Second, the knowledge about loanee increases the likelihood of repayment. 
Khandker (1998) points to the impact of micro-credit being low, owing to low 
level of oral mathematical skills and reading and writing skills of recipients.  He also 
points to the fact that full impact of the credit on long-run behaviours can be 
measured by evaluation over a longer period of time.  He also raises questions on the 
group-based lending and whether this mechanism of lending is as effective as 
individual based lending.  One thing is clear about group-based lending, that it does 
make credit accessible to those who do not have collateral to receive loans.  This 
makes a strong argument for micro credit programmes.  It also creates social capital, 
which helps people to fight poverty.  However, the argument on literacy has strength 
that it creates impediment in acquiring micro-credit and its use in a more productive 
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way.  In addition to owning resources such as skills, knowledge etc., it is important 
that people have social capital, that is, network of friends and relatives to provide 
support.  Woolcock and Narayan have dealt the subject of social capital stating that 
people deprived of this resource are worse off financially and otherwise.  They are 
also unable to participate and benefit from programme.  This argument is 
corroborated in the present study, where destitute constitute a miniscule portion of 
loanees and by and large remain outside the network of social capital. 
The other aspect is about the formal and informal markets of credit.  There are 
no two opinions that the demand for credit in rural areas from small farmers and 
landless is immense [Malik (1999); Aleem (1990); Bell (1990)].  However, supply of 
credit does not meet the demand for credit.  Perhaps, this could be one reason for 
high interest rates.  The demand for credit is demonstrated by the fact that local 
money lender and shopkeeper, big farmer etc., provide loans to small farmers in cash 
or kind.  Sometimes the interest charged could be much more than what is charged 
by the formal institutions. The vacuum created in absence of formal institution is an 
opportunity to have institutions providing micro-credit to those who are in its need. 
 
Definition of Micro Credit 
What one further finds in the literature on rural finance is the lack of clarity of 
concept about micro credit for poor.  As a matter of fact this concept has been used 
and applied in variety of context and used interchangeably with micro-financing such 
examples include Badan Kredit Kecamatan (BKK) Indonesia, Agriculture 
Cooperation, Banks Rakyat Indo Unit Desa.   
Micro-credit is defined as a credit provided to ‘poor’ free of collateral through 
institutionalised mechanism (the only collateral is the “peer” collateral).  This credit 
is made available as and when needed, at the doorstep of client [Bajwa (2001)].  On 
the other hand, micro-finance is inclusive of savings and other services. 
This paper is divided in four parts.  Section one deals with the issues of 
defining poor to whom micro-credit is focused and the benchmarks used in defining 
the poor client.  Section two covers measuring the snapshot impact of the programme 
in terms of improvement in income of target group.  Section three covers cost of the 
programme and section four gives analysis of issues. 
 
I.  MICRO CREDIT FOR WHOM? 
The micro credit scheme of the PRSP aims to rectify the neglect towards the 
rural poor for access to credit from formal financial institutions, collateral 
requirements, cumbersome procedures, corruption, remoteness of the villages, etc. The 
credit programme of the PRSP is providing the rural poor with easy access to credit. 




        Purpose Duration of Loan 
Agriculture Inputs Seed, Fertiliser, Agro- chemicals Up to 12 months 
Enterprise Development Working Capital Up to 24 months 
Livestock Development Fattening/Breeding, Sheep, Goats and 
Calves Milching Animals  
Up to 12 months                
Up to 30 months           
Small Infrastructure as 
Individual Enterprise SIIE 
Development of Production                 
Infrastructures 
Up to 24 months         
(individuals), up to 60 
months to COs 
 
Who qualifies for the above loan?  How does the programme define its client:  
the poor.  Who is poor?  is a big question in any poverty alleviation programme.  
There are many definitions and criteria when it comes to concrete action steps to 
design a project.  It appears hard to pin down poverty and the poor, since the concept 
of poverty is relative and has many dimensions.  The definition starts with income 
levels of household, which are taken as $1 or $2 a day [World Bank (2000-2001)].  It 
is also defined in terms of daily consumption of 2250 calories per individual.  Any 
body taking less calories than these is poor.  Although there is an argument that 
individual caloric needs are determined according to ones body requirement and life 
style and thus these may vary a lot from person to person.   
Another definition is the level of accessibility to such services as health, 
education etc., lack of empowerment and voice; sub-human living etc.  All these 
definitions describe conditions of poverty from different dimensions.  These describe 
human state where basic needs are unmet; human deprivations are extreme and 
individuals are unable to contribute and gain in economic terms because of these 
deprivations.  Thus, the description of poverty has the economists’, sociologists’, 
anthropologists’, nutritionists’, policy-makers’ description.  Annexure–I gives 
various definitions used by international agencies.  These wide array of definitions 
describe human conditions, however, each would require different approach.  
Therefore, any programme of poverty alleviation must determine very clearly what 
definition and benchmark are applied to a particular programme. 
Keeping the above difficulty in view, PRSP has evolved a definition of 
poor, by asking the community organisation members to ascribe themselves to a 
category of rich, well-to-do, poor, very poor and destitute.  Table 2, gives 
‘physical assets’ (parameters), possessed by household as indicative of 
‘Poverty’.  These physical assets comprise land-size, source of income, 
transport/farm machinery, house condition, access to agriculture inputs, 
livestock, access to education and access to health facilities etc.  The members of 
CO place themselves in one of the category according to whether they possess 
physical assets and to what degree. 
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Table 2 
Indicators for Poverty Profile According to the Living Standards of People 
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The Table 2 is a starting point the CO members describe themselves as ‘poor’ 
and ‘not poor’.  It is purely based on the perception of people about their state of 
being poor or otherwise.  These perceptions, however, may or may not be real 
because individuals will understate income and wealth to receive benefit.  This 
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places a great onus on the programme organisers to be extra vigilant and refine 
parameters as the programme progresses.  
According to the Report on “Social Development in Pakistan—Towards 
Poverty Reduction”, possession of land and livestock in rural areas, reduces 
incidence of poverty by 55 percent.  The report presents a ladder of poverty 
reduction, showing that poverty is reduced maximum, if household possesses 
physical assets, then it is reduced by being employed, then by transfers, education 
and minimum by family support.  The Table 2 of PRSP is close to the SPDC ladder 
of poverty reduction which focuses more on the extent of the possession of physical 
assets and accessibility to education and health.  Actual repayment rate is also 
dependent on the possession of some physical assets by loanees. 
It may be mentioned that all Rural Support Programmes in Pakistan have been 
able to reach 1.70 percent of the total poor in the country.  A comparison with other 
known programmes in the world is given in Table 3.  The Table shows that the 
outreach of these programmes is limited. 
Table 4, shows loan disbursed according to the level of ‘wellness’ of loanees, 
over the three years.  During 1998-99, 1999-2000 and 2000—March 2001, 70 
percent, 75 percent and 79 percent respectively loans have been provided to ‘poor’ 
and ‘very poor’.  It can be safely inferred from the Table generated from data-base of 
PRSP that the programme is targeted to the ‘poor’ and ‘very poor’.  The data reflects 
that 30 percent of the total loan disbursed during 1998-99 were given to ‘well-to-do’ 
and ‘better-off’ and 70 percent of the total loans went to  ‘poor’ ‘very poor’ and 
destitute.  Destitutes, however, did not benefit much from the programme.  It is 
stated, those socially secluded, because of lack of physical assets, do not get the 
chance of coming in the fold of programme. 
 
Table 3 
The Number of Borrowers and Percentage of Population Serviced by Six NGOs 
Involved in Rural Finance Services. Data for BAAC, BKK, BUD and 
GB Taken from Yaron (1992) 
Organisation Country and Year 
Number of 
Borrowers 
% of Population 
Serviced 
Bank for Agriculture and 
Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC)    Thailand 2,600,000 52 (of farming pop.) 
Badan Kredit Kacamatan 
(BKK) Indonesia 510,000 1.8 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia Unit 
Desa (BUD) Indonesia (1989) 1,600,000 Not available 
Grameen Bank (GB) Bangladesh (1990) 660,000 17.2 (of target pop.) 
Diocesan Development Services 
(DDS) Nigeria (1996) 30,000 3.0 (of Igala pop.*) 
All RSPs Pakistan (1999-2001) 147,000 1.7 (of target pop.) 
*Assumes an Igala population of 1,000,000. 
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Table  4 
Credit Disbursed to Various Categories (1998-99 – March 2001) 
1998-99 1999-2000 2000 – uptill March 2001  
No. Amount % No. Amount % No. Amount % 
Well to do 697 11,690,061 10.6 1,816 24,320,419 6.5 1,170 17,301,000 5.2 
Better-off 1,577 21,055,652 19.1 4,612 68,734,516 18.4 4,102 53,659,880 16.3 
Poor 4,671 54,324,630 49.5 4,162 196,247,490 52.8 12,564 170,908,471 52.0 
Very Poor 1,931 22,289,757 20.3 6,626 81,820,768 22.0 7443 86,436,423 20.0 
Destitute 36 349,000 0.03 62 547,000 .14 34 253,000 .07 
Total 8,912 109,709,100  17,278 371,670,193  25,313 328,558,774  
Source: PRSP MIS data. 
 
While the MIS data indicates that loans have gone to poor and very poor, the 
survey results show that loans have been acquired by those not so poor.  Around 20 
percent of the loans went to those who had land size between 0.5 to 12 acres and had 
pacca and semi-pacca houses. 
If we see Table 4 in light of Table 2 what we know is those in the category of 
‘rich’ and ‘better-off’ should not have been recipient of micro credit.  The loans 
should have been directed to poor and very poor. 
A survey was conducted in these villages and loanees were interviewed to 
determine, if the loans have gone to the really poor.  The criteria was more or less the 
criteria of PRSP.  5 percent of the loanees were farmers with the average land size of 
5.6 acres. The mode was 2 acres, median 5 and the range was 0.5-12 acres. The 
education level of most of loanees in the sample was 5+ years.  The literacy level was 
61 percent, 80 percent of people had pacca houses and 10 percent had semi-pacca.  
Table 5 shows the level of well being of loanees in the sample.  
 
Table 5 
Indicators and Level of Well-being of Loanees 
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Use of Credit 
An important argument in provision and use of micro-credit is ‘entitlement’ 
relations, which comprise what an individual owns and ‘exchange entitlement’.  In other 
words, according to Sen, the capability of individual to find employment; sell non-labour 
assets; what can be produced from own labour; cost of purchasing resources and value of 
product, and the benefits one is entitled to get (social security) will determine whether 
one would be able to stay out of poverty, deprivation and hunger or not.   
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Thus, micro credit will help individuals to remain out of poverty to the extent of 
their entitlement as defined by A. Sen.  SPDC’s argument, of having physical assets and 
employment are similar to A. Sen, because both arguments state that individual need to 
posses either non-labour assets (physical assets) and labour (skill, capability, 
employment) to be able to reap benefit of a programme.  Therefore, such programmes 
inherently exclude the extremely poor who may not be able to participate in the 
programme because of lack of physical assets, capability, sell products at a value in 
market etc.  This increases vulnerability of poor to remain poor.  It would, therefore, be 
suggested that capabilities of poor and very poor be enhanced through functional literacy 
programmes, to reduce the risk of people falling in the trap of deprivation.    
As Table 6 indicates, the loans are given for a business activity, in which 
individuals have capability and experience.  Table  6 provides information on types of 
loans given to individuals, since the last three years of operation of the programme. 
From Table 6, it can also be inferred that loans are largely acquired for 
livestock.  About 43 percent of loans in year 1998-99 were for this purpose.  Loans 
for livestock for both years 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 were 47 percent.  What is 
interesting to observe is that loans for enterprise declined over the three years that 
are analysed.  There could be two explanations for this.  First, that easy availability 
of credit encouraged creditors to venture for riskier project.  Second, peer learning 
persuaded people to invest in ventures where there was capability and experience. 
The small-size farmers, or rural poor, invest in livestock because of the knowledge 
and experience of keeping livestock.  The livestock is investment in physical assets that 
meets additional income and domestic milk requirement.  In rural areas, large number of 
small-size farmers and others as well keep livestock for this purpose.   
Table 7 gives information on credit disbursed from 1998 to March 2001, to 
male and female beneficiaries.  There are some important learning points in the data.  
47 percent of the beneficiaries got credit for raising livestock.  Out of this 47 percent, 
41 percent were female who acquired loan for this purpose.  Also percentage 
recovery of female beneficiary is almost 2 percent higher than male beneficiaries.  
What do we learn?  There is a potential in female in rural areas to successfully 
undertake commercial activity by raising livestock and return credit.  A study carried 
out for Grameen Bank and Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) 
suggests that women’s financial control over funded enterprises tends to be greater 
when loans are used for poultry and livestock, reflecting women’s traditional 
involvement in homestead-based activities [Hashemi, Schuler and Riley (1996)].  
Some instances of women being used as proxy loanees are also observed in 
the study of two villages.  The women of influential landlords of the village got one 
time loan and invested in purchase of livestock and poultry.  Since they were not 
able to maintain the business themselves and men worked in the city, therefore, they 
sold off the livestock after paying back the loan. 
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Table 6 
Credit Disbursed According to Type of Business 
(1998 – March 2001) 
1998-99 1999-2000 2000 – uptill March 2001  
No. Amount % No. Amount % No. Amount % 
Livestock 4,696 70,205,000 43.0 13,171 171,569,000 47.7 11,300 135,780,400 47 
Agri. Inputs 2,028 26,411,100 16.0 4,912 56,288,726 15.6 6,843 73,653,725 26 
Enterprise 3,311 59,405,500 36.0 6,247 93,412,726 26.0 4,442 54,275,400 19 
Small Infra as 
Individual 
Enterprise (SIIE) 355 6,865,000 4.0 2,185 32,081,748 8.9 2,008 23,999,270 8.3 
Total 10,390 162,886,600 100.0 26,515 359,351,474 100.0 24,596 287,708,795 100.0 
Source: PRSP MIS data. 
 
Table 7  
Credit Disbursement According to Gender and Type of Credit 




(Rs) Male Female Total 
Average Size of 
Loan (Rs) 
Agriculture 156,353,551 12,669 1,114 13,783 11,344 
Enterprise 207,092,900 11,619 2,377 13,996 14,797 
Livestock 383,554,400 17,066 12,101 29,167 13,150 
SIIE 62,946,018 3,723 825 4,548 13,840 
Total 809,946,869 45,077 16,417 61,494  
      
Total Credit Recovered   418,654,771 114,197,539   
Percentage Recovery  Male   93.4 Female 94.82   
Source: PRSP MIS Data. 
 
Villages Studied: Ladheki Nevian and Pandoki 
The micro-credit programme experience was studied in the two villages.  
These villages are Ladheki Nevian and Pandoki in Lahore District located 40 km 
away from Lahore.  The experience of credit programme was different in the two 
villages.  Secondary data on the socio-economic profile of the two villages was 
obtained from Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS).  The PRSP Regional Office 
Lahore had data on credit profile of the two villages.  Table 8 gives the socio-
economic profile of Ladheki Nevian and Pandoki.  
Both the villages are in proximity to Lahore and are well-off villages.  The 
relative wellness of the villages can be inferred from its literacy rate and percentage 
of pacca houses.  The literacy rate of Ladheki Nevian and Pandoki are 34.3 and 44.4 
percent respectively.  The female literacy rate in Ladheki is lower as compared to 
Pandoki.  70 percent of the houses in Ladheki Nevian and 89 percent in Pandoki are 
pacca houses.  The average household size in Ladheki and Pandoki is 6.6 and 7.3 
respectively.  Interestingly female literacy is higher in Pandoki. 
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Table 8 
Social Indicators of Ladheki Nevian and Pandoki 
 Ladheki Nevian Pandoki 
Area (Acres) 2,310 4,173 
Population 3,178 8,012 
Male 1,659 4,091 
Female 1,519 3,921 
Average HH size 6.6 7.3 
Literacy Ratio   
10+ (%) 34.3 44.4 
Primary but below Matric  451 1,247 
Male 326 855 
Female 125 392 
Matric+:   
Male 134 532 
Female 16 236 
Religion   
Muslim 2,977 7,585 
Others 201 427 
Age Groups   
18 and + 1,705 4,148 
21 Years + 1,472 3,527 
Female:   
15–49 Years 649 1,721 
Currently married 427 1,147 
Type of House   
Pacca 340 979 
Semi Pacca 24 51 
Kacha 119 68 
Total 483 1,098 
Other Facilities   
Potable Water 2 325 
Electricity 408 966 
Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics. 
 
It may be stated that PRSP’s profile of village is entirely based on the 
information provided by the villagers and thus there is variation in statistics of PRSP 
and FBS.  It may also be pointed out, that PRSP in the last three years has not 
developed benchmarks for the villages, in which the Programme is introduced.  
These benchmarks are very essential part of monitoring and evaluation of the 
programme because these will indicate exante and expost conditions of the villages 
and improvement/change in socio-economic indicator owing to programme 
intervention. 
Table 9 gives profile of the two villages in terms of credit disbursed, credit 
beneficiaries, loans for each type of business activity, poverty status and recovery 
position. 
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Table 9 
Micro-credit Profile of Ladheke Nevian and Pandoki 
 Ladheke Nevian Pandoki 
Village Population 3,395 14,000 
Community Organisations (COs) 12 5 
Member Households 240 119 
Credit Portfolio:   
1.   Total Credit Disbursed Rs 2,804,000 2,193,000 
Male Rs 2,359,000 1,480,000 
Female Rs 445,000 713,000 
2. Total COs Benefiting from 
Credit 9 5 
Male 6 3 
Female 3 2 
3.  Credit Beneficiaries  
Male 119 75 
Female 30 45 
4.   Sectoral Allocation (Rs) 
 (Amount) (%) (Amount) (%) 
Agriculture and Small 
Infrastructure 
415,000 15 245,000 11 
Livestock 1,761,000 63 813,000 37 
Micro-enterprise 628,000 22 1,135,000 52 
5.   Poverty Status of Credit  
      Beneficiaries 
Above Poor 43 28.85% 39 32.50% 
Poor and Very Poor 106 71.15% 81 67.50% 










  Male 1,999,835 1,919,958 96.0 1,651,424 1,014,663 61.4 
  Female 177,829 176,801 99.4 726,357 547,493 75.4 
  Total 2,177,664 2,096,759 96.3 2,377,781 1,562, 156 65.7 
Source: PRSP, Lahore Region Office. 
 
Ladheki Nevian has population of 3395, while Pandoki has 14000.  These 
figures are not even close to the figures of FBS.  With lesser population the CO 
organisation are 12 as compared to 5 in Pandoki.  The village with more COs seems 
to be more active and mobilised and thus exerting more peer monitoring for 
repayment of loans.  A closer look at the working of COs in Pandoki revealed that 
most of the COs were deeply caste entrenched.  One influential of the village 
dominated, steered and maneuvered the functioning of loan.  Even the social 
organiser was under his influence.  The females were used as proxy loanees. 
In Ladheke 63 percent credit was given for livestock whereas it was 37 
percent in Pandoki.  It was for micro-enterprise in Pandoki, for which people 
acquired loan (52 percent).  Does it mean it is safer to give credit for ventures in 
which people have capability?  Or is it the socio economic profile of community 
determines what business would attract investment. 
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If the relationship between beneficiaries’ status and repayment is analysed in 
the two villages, as a case in point, it is observed that in Pandoki 67.5 percent poor 
and in Ladheke 71.0 percent poor received credit and the rate of repayment is higher 
in the latter case.  This corroborates the argument that poor are more credit worthy 
than better-off.  The argument of women being more credit worthy is also supported 
by the data.  In both the villages female rate of repayment is higher than male 
repayment rate.  The other important parameter for avoiding bad loans is the 
entrenched caste system to be either avoided or its influence minimised through the 
positive and assertive role of social organiser. 
To whom the credit is directed to in the two villages and its outcome, is worth 
discussing.  The ‘poor and very poor’ in Ladheki Nevian got more loans (71.15 
percent).  Also repayments are lower in the more prosperous village (Pandoki).  The 
reason for the loans not being targeted is perhaps owing to political economy of the 
villages where better off receive credit, violating rules of repayment, without fear of 
accountability. Second, the homogeneity of social and economic structure.  If a CO 
comprises of rich and poor and the inequalities are high, the cohesiveness in the CO 
will be absent or little.  Well-off will tend to dominate, consequently resulting in 
reduce repayment rate and the absence of more targeted loan structure.  It was 
observed in Pandoki that one or two influential families dominated the formation of 
CO.  The other castes1 were excluded, perhaps socially these are pariah castes and do 
not feel confident amongst the influential.   
 
II.  MEASURING IMPACT OF MICRO CREDIT 
Impact assessment of micro credit programmes are advocated to assess 
whether the programme is ‘good value for money’.  It is also important to see the 
‘impact’ on the intended beneficiaries in terms of income, wealth, food security, 
child nutrition, quality of life or gender relation [Copestake (1995)]. 
It would be too early to see the impact on overall welfare of villages owing to 
PRSP micro-credit programme.  However, one can make qualitative assessment.  On 
one of the visits to a village Ladheki Nevian, in a focused group interview, a woman 
mentioned that she had taken a loan of Rs 15,000 in December 2000 to set up a 
grocery shop.  Her husband worked as a daily wage-earner.  Sometimes he would get 
work, other times he won’t.  Now he runs the grocery shop.  The shop is a small set-
up in the premises of her house.  According to her, she earns about Rs 2200 per 
month.  Rs 965 are given as loan installment.  She also has some income from 
poultry.  It is a family of six members.  Both, husband and wife were weak and pale.  
The income at least provided some certainty to the family.   
1These castes are based on occupation in village.  For example Taili (extracts oil), kumhar (a 
potter), mochi (a cobbler), Julaha or Ansari  (a weaver).  These low castes remain excluded from micro 
credit programme. 
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The quantitative assessment of the impact on income was determined in terms 
of income before and after the credit in the two villages through a survey.  These 
results are given in Table 10. 
 
Table 10 
Average Income Before and After Loan and Percentage Change  
in the Income for Each Type of Business 
Type of Business % 
Average Income 
Before Credit (Rs) 
Average Income After 
Credit (Rs) 




Micro Enterprise 25 2514 5500 118 
Livestock  43 2666 5833 118.7 
Agri. Input 25 4528 5785 27.7 
SIIE 7.2 1750 3000 71.4 
Source:  Survey. 
 
The results of the survey show that 43 percent of the loans were taken for 
livestock.  The percentage change in income, after the credit in livestock business was 
118.  Small individual Investment Enterprise (SIIE) also had a significant percentage 
improvement (71.4) in income.  These changes in income are one time change.  What 
happens to income in the long run is determined by what one possesses and the overall 
economic growth of the country.  As these changes in income are responses of loanees 
themselves, it is presumed that certain business will yield quick return. 
Households may derive benefits, such as income, employment, consumption 
and access to credit.  However, benefits from programme must be at best as great as 
the costs for households to participate in a credit programme.  Possible benefits of 
participation include induced changes in income, employment and other welfare 
indicators.  With increase in income, people tend to add to their existing physical 
assets, e.g., an addition of room in a house, addition to livestock etc.   
Expenditure on education and health are dependent on other factors.  In case 
of education, proximity of school (especially for girls), and availability of teacher are 
important determining factors.  For health purpose, people in village may go to 
hakeems, quacks etc., in case the health facility is not in close proximity and doctor 
and medicines are not available.   
The importance of education is low in rural areas.  An increase in the income 
of very poor, increases expenditure on food first and not education.  One reason that 
education receives low priority is that it is not functional and does not have visible 
benefits on improvement on life.  Generally people view that education does not 
have immediate return.  Completion of 10 years of education is perceived as getting 
an employment, preferably in government.  Since girls are not suppose to work for 
wages and salaries, therefore, educating them is not important.  If it is made 
functional, people may see other benefits as well.   
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Explicit interest cost of borrowing and implicit costs associated with 
programme participation, such as attending group meetings and monitoring fellow 
members’ ……., constitute the possible cost of programme participation, [Sinha 
(1998)].  Generally, the implicit cost are not felt so much, if explicit costs generate 
reasonable benefit.  However, for poor it also provides a social network to participate 
and derive benefit from the programme. 
As impact is indirectly measured from the rate of repayment, because this rate 
determines what amount is paid back and what retained and saved the ensuing 
paragraphs will focus on these two aspect. 
 
Savings Analysis 
Main purpose of savings is to inculcate a habit of savings and form a capital 
base in the community, which can then be used to serve their needs, reducing 
dependence on the external borrowing.  These also indicate whether there is enough 
to consume and save in a community.  Savings also depends on propensity to save. 
The COs/villagers are motivated to enhance their savings to become self 
sufficient so that no further loans be taken by/from other institutions. There are 
examples, where communities are helping from their own savings. In many cases 
loans are given from the savings for urgent needs.  The individuals can also 
withdraw a maximum of 50 percent of his/her savings.  However, all withdrawals or 
loans from the savings cannot be given without PRSP knowledge.  
The habit of savings initially developed through an agreement within the CO 
members that no loan will be recommended to any body until and unless he/she 
saves some money on regular basis.  Initially the response to this was poor, however, 
after realising the importance of savings the CO members are cooperating and there 
is regular saving practice among the members. Those who save more, are entitled to 
withdraw more when they need.  
RSPs success in mobilising savings is important for self-sustainability.  The 
financial ratio of the value of RSPs savings deposit to its loan portfolio and changes in 
this ratio over time indicates the success of RSPs in replacing concessional funds from 
donors and the government [Yaron (1992)].  The savings facilities of RSP can 
potentially reach a greater number of clients than its lending activities, with the average 
outstanding value of deposits and the saving account significantly smaller than that of 
average loan extended.  If financial intermediary is genuine and not just disbursement 
window, it provides saving services to far more depositors than borrowers. 
Table 11, provides information of credit disbursed and savings. Savings constitute 
7.79 percent of credit disbursed.2  Gujranwala, COs have highest savings.  Credit 
disbursed  is  also  highest  for  Gujranwala  CO members.  As the ratio of savings to loan  
2International experience of Grameen Bank, Bangladesh, the Bank for Agriculture and 
Agricultural Cooperative, Thailand, Badein Kredit Kecamatan and Bank Rakyat Indonesia Unit Desa is 
that their savings as percentage of loan portfolio is 31 percent, 42 percent, 20 percent and 110 percent 
respectively. This has improved their financial self-sustainability. 
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Table 11 
Credit Disbursed and Savings of Community Organisation 
Uptill March 2001 
 Lahore G’wala Narowal F’abad Sargodha Sahiwal Multan M’ Garh Total 
Credit (Rs) 
  (000) 70,609 142,454 65,606 46,398 101,369 72,171 116,133 195,204 809,946 
Total Savings 
(Rs) of CO 
(000) 6,576 12,538 6,470 6,080 10,878 4,728 8,411 7,487 63,171 
Source: PRSP MIS Data. 
 
portfolio is low, it shows that the Programme has to go a long way to reach sustainability.  
The total savings as on June, 2001 of all RSP were Rs 742.6 million. These are the 
savings of 668,187 members of all CO.  The average saving per CO was Rs 28,190.  
There are 26322 COs registered with the RSP credit schemes. The average saving per 
member was Rs 1,111.  The females savings were less as compared to males.   
 
Repeat Loans 
PRSP has no data base to determine the number of repeat loans.  However, as 
the organisation is in its initial years, overall there may be few repeat loans.  In the 
survey conducted in the village the repeat loans were 14 percent of the sample.  This 
is on the higher side as for the programme being in its initially years. 
Why organisation would not discourage repeat loans?  First, those who can 
pay back loans, why should they be deprived of second or third opportunity of 
getting loan.  It may be mentioned here that Grameen bank loanees have taken 3.4 
loans on the average, while BRAC loanees have taken 2.1. 
Second, the high repayment rate, even with second or third loan, surely 
shows good performance of the organisation.  Also, the very heart of micro-credit 
is high repayment rate.  Therefore, as money is fungible, the high repayment 
reduces fungibility.  Thus, such organisations will not discourage repeat loans as 
such. 
 
III. OPERATIONAL COST AND SUSTAINABILITY 
The PRSP signed an agreement with Habib Bank Limited, consequently the  
bank extended a running finance facility, against endowment of Rs 500 million at a 
markup of 14 percent per annum.  From this running facility small loans to various 
community organisations are given with a maximum ceiling of Rs 30,000.  
The Figure 1 below shows the source of income and use of credit: 
It may be mentioned here, that PRSP is also tapping other sources of 
increasing its pool of resources.  This strengthens the argument that micro-credit 



























As mentioned earlier, sustainability relates to the ability of the programme to 
continue to lend, more and more money to the poor which in turn is dependent on 
repayment rate.  In order, to keep its repayment rate high a large part of the credit goes to 
not ‘so poor’ people.  The survey results show that loans have been given to non-poor.  
Anil Bhatt and others have also mentioned that “initiative and leadership are provided by 
either the extension agent from outside or the social animators and catalysts or somewhat 
better-off, more informed and better educated people from the community”.  Similar 
conclusions are given by Waheed on the basis of her study of such organisations that 
there are two prerequisites necessary for people to organise and carry out collective work, 
these are “awareness of problems and needs and minimum threshold of resources”. 
The financial analysis of the last two years (1999 and 2000) was done to 
determine sustainability of the programme.  There is limitation to financial analysis 
as it is confined to an examination of the statement of accounts. 
The current assets and current liabilities of PRSP as well as the income and 
expenditure of the organisation for the financial year 2000 as compared with the 
financial year 1999 is given below at Tables 12 and 13. 
Government of Punjab 
Endowment Fund 
Credit Line: to provide 
loan to COs members 





(Also used as 
collateral) 
Interest income divided 
amongst 8 regions for 
covering fixed and 
operating costs 
Loan recovery 
(Principal and Interest) 
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Table 12 





Current Assets   
Interest Receivable 17,283,802 7,959,198 
Advances, Deposits, Prepayments and other 
Receivables 8,539,233 9,876,016 
Loans to Community Organisations 287,529,117 135,195,186 
Cash and Bank Balance 9,145,370 26,308,642 
 322,497,522 179,339,042 
Current Liabilities   
Short-term Borrowing-Secured 216,738,825 122,004,231 
Creditors, Accrued and other Liabilities 16,467,398 7,404,636 
Provision  for Taxation 1,282,739 500,600 
 234,488,962 129,909,467 
Net Current Assets 88,008,560 49,429,575 
Source: Annual Report 2000. 
 
Table 13 





Income/Grants   
Profit on Investments 90,000,000 90,742,500 
Income on Service Charges 14,067,266 2,689,832 
Other Income 3,644,496 758,262 
 107,711,762 94,190,594 
Expenditure   
Operating cost 7,789,198 3,673,356 
Field Operations  
(Social Organisation) 
43,261,146 34,239,017 
Programme Assistance 10,016,278 4,964,900 
Provision for Doubtful Debts 7,135,180 3,335,587 
 68,201,802 46,212,860 
Source:  Annual Report 2000. 
 
Financial Analysis for the Years 1999-2000 
PRSP is lending  money to various community organisations from the running  
finance  facility.  The interest rate charged to members of CO is 20 percent. The 
running finance carries a mark up of 14 percent.  There is gap of 6 percent between 
the two.    Service charges earned during the year 2000 were Rs 42.886 million and 
mark up paid against running finance facility was Rs 28.819 million.  There is a net 
earning of Rs 14.067 million during the year 2000 as compared to 2.690 million in 
1999. With an increase in operations the net earning is likely to drop further. PRSP 
will have to continually raise additional funds for fixed investment thus improving 
the interest accrual on such investment. 
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An analysis of loans to COs and expenditure to provide loan shows that a Rs 
100 loans has Rs 23.7 operating cost.  An illustration of financial sustainability of 
PRSP, and how it relates to other such organisations is given in Table 14.  It also 
gives the value of subsidy dependence index (SDI)3  for other known institutions and 
PRSP providing micro-credit.  For given years the SDI is quite high and indicates 
that subsidy is required.  The SDI for PRSP is high, confirming that the organisation 
is not very self-sufficient.  The interest rates would have to be increased from 20 to 
at least 30 percent to cover operational cost.  The interest rates however, will have to 
be managed within a range by improving operational efficiency, making organisation 
lean, expanding operations (economy of scale) etc. 
 
Table 14 
Values of the Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI) for PRSP Along With Some Well-
known Rural Finance Institutions (Based on Data Provided in Yaron (1992) ) 
Institution  Country Year SDI (%) 
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Operating costs have increased from Rs 3.673 million in 1999 to Rs 7.789 
million in the year 2000. The main increase in operating cost was due to considerable 
increase in the salaries in this period, i.e., from Rs 1,004,828 to Rs 3,119,280  an 
increase of 210 percent.  Other operating expenses, e.g., traveling, vehicle running, 
meetings and conferences also increased with the level of activity.   
The entire sustainability of PRSP is predicated to achieving a constantly 
high rates of recovery of  loans.  In the process of expansion of operation, the 
ability to maintain a high rate of recovery should not be compromised.  Were this 
to happen, the provision for bad debts would increase, which may jeopardise future 
loaning.  
3Subsidy dependence index (SDI) measures the percentage increase in the average on-lending rate 
required to compensate for eliminating subsidies, including the subsidy a financial institution receives 
through paying interest below the market rate on its borrowed fund.  The subsidy is measured against the 
interest earned on the financial institutions annual average outstanding loan portfolio because lending is 
the prime activity of supply-led financial institution. 
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IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
In all this discussion, the central question is that micro credit programme 
remain a vital intervention in poverty alleviation policy.  The refinement in the 
programmes needs to be introduced in targeting the poor only and as far as possible 
the loans should be avoided to ‘well- to-do’ and ‘better-off’. It was analysed that this 
trend was declining, and in 2001, 21 percent of the loan went to ‘well-to-do’ and 
‘better-off’ and the remaining to poor and very poor.  It may not be pragmatic in the 
given setup and structure of RSPs to avoid ‘resourceful’ individuals.  The reasons are 
quite obvious.  One known fact is that the ability to organise is correlated to a degree 
of resourcefulness.  Extremely poor and destitute on the average may not be able to 
organise.  For extremely poor and destitute a separate kind of poverty intervention 
strategy is required. 
The coverage of such programmes is not widespread. Even Grameen Bank 
(GB), which is operating since mid-seventies, has been able to reach 17.2 percent of 
the target population. The important policy questions remains, is their justification 
for such programmes, which have high SDI and outreach is not wide spread. Such 
interventions, as micro-credit, have maximum benefit during period of high 
economic growth. Unfortunately, developing countries, especially in Pakistan policy-
makers have failed to address the issue of poverty reduction in a more focused and 
targeted manner during periods of high growth. Thus, such interventions as micro- 
credit, safety nets, etc., were a delayed response to poverty issue.  The micro credit 
programme was launched in late seventies in Bangladesh and was known to the 
world in early 1980s.  Also, during mid-seventies and eighties these programmes 
were introduced in Thailand, Indonesia and Nigeria.  While the developing countries 
were focusing on micro-credit as an instrument for reducing poverty, Pakistan sat 
complacent on the issue.  There is tendency in government to sit smug on issues, till 
donors push on problems and solutions. 
There is debate and argument against micro credit programme as an 
instrument of poverty reduction, because of its limited coverage, high SDI, greater 
operational cost.  It is also said that it manages poverty but does not reduce it.  
Unlike other instruments of poverty reduction, like food stamps, safety nets etc., 
which is a direct help in cash and kind, micro credit provides self-esteem to people 
and enable them to use their skills to employ themselves gainfully.  It may be 
mentioned that micro-enterprise loans, given in urban areas to ‘start-up’ business can 
lead to successful large business provided economy is growing as well.  The gains 
from micro-credit programme in rural areas can be enhanced if the functional 
literacy of people at village level is improved. 
Despite the high cost of the programmes, collusion amongst members of 
community organisation and exclusion of other castes; the communities find these 
programmes useful as compared to loans from local money lender, big farmers and 
even formal institution, because of ‘less’ interest rates and ease of procedures.  
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Exclusion of low caste, however, can be systematically and by design reduced by the 
staff of the organisation. 
The other question often raised is also the opportunity cost of investing in 
micro-credit programme vis-à-vis investment in health, education, developing 
physical infrastructure, agriculture etc. In developing countries, especially Pakistan, 
governments have not been able to achieve success in social and human development 
sector. The beneficiaries of social and human development have not been poor. 
There has been systematic and tacit exclusion of poor in all programmes of 
government.  The only programmes which have been able to leave impact (no matter 
how small) were those which were  outside government. Therefore, PRSP, and other 
such programmes can remain useful provided these remain open to question, 
continue to re-evaluate, monitor, do not become top heavy, keep responding to users 
and achieve financial self-sustainability. 
To attain financial self-sustainability, it is important that RSPs lay greater 
emphasis on encouraging savings of CO.  Increase in savings as percentage of loan 
portfolio will make these organisations independent of donors’ subsidised 
endowments/capital and improve self-sustainability. 
PRSP has shown impact in terms of improvement in income.  However, there 
are some caveat.  PRSP is focusing in regions, where achieving results are easier, 
therefore, it should try to outreach those regions as well which are a bit riskier.  Also, 
it should try to make best use of local expertise and knowledge for example, most of 
the loans are acquired for purchase of cows, buffaloes, poultry etc.  Could PRSP 
develop a central collection point for milk; where villagers are able to fetch market 
price for their product; and then the milk (and butter) can be delivered  to the dairy 
plants nearby. 
Finally, government need to look into devising different programmes for 
different ‘target groups of poor’, e.g. there are poor who have skills and but not 
capital (a detailed profile needs to be developed for such target group), then there are 
those who do not have skills, but have physical capital; those who are destitute, but 
are willing to work etc., therefore, each sub-programme could possibly cater to the 
needs of different target groups.  The micro-credit should be for only those who have 
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Annexure  I 
 
Definition of Poverty 
Key Term Definition 
Human Poverty The lack of essential human capabilities, notably literacy and 
nutrition. 
Income Poverty The lack of sufficient income to meet minimum consumption 
needs. 
Absolute Poverty The degree of poverty below which the minimal requirements for 
survival are not being met.  This is a fixed measure in terms of a 
minimum caloric requirement plus essential nonfood components.  
While absolute poverty is often used interchangeably with extreme 
poverty, the meaning of the latter may vary, depending on local 
interpretations or calculations. 
Relative Poverty Normally defined in relations to some ratio of the absolute poverty 
line or, as in developed countries, as a proportion of average 
income per capita.  As a relative measure, it can differ across 
countries or over time. 
Human Development Index United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) composite of 
three factors (i) life expectancy at birth, (ii) adult literacy, and (iii) 
income per capita (adjusted for purchasing power parity). 
Human Poverty Index UNDP measure of deprivation is basic human development.  The 
variables used to determine the index are (i) the percentage of 
people expected to die before age 40; (ii) the percentage of adults 
who are illiterate; and (iii) overall economic provisioning, in terms 
of the percentage of people without access to health services and 
safe water, and the percentage of underweight children below age 
five. 
Gender Empowerment Measure UNDP assessment of the level of gender inequality in key areas of 
economic and political participation and decision-making. 
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This is a single most important issue that has been presented this morning: the 
issue of Micro-credit, Poverty and Development. This paper is extremely valuable on 
two scores: Firstly, it puts together all the work that is being done in this field in 
Pakistan. Secondly, in dealing with these two case studies virtually every major issue 
in the field of micro-credit has been thrown up. Unfortunately, however because of 
the size of the paper and partly it lacks focus, it has not really explored the issues 
very thoroughly. We are not going be able to do it within 10 minutes or 15 minutes, 
which I have.  
Three issues are singled out in this paper: the issue of targeting the poor; the 
issue of sustaining of micro-credit programmes; and the issue of the programme 
impact. This covers a very wide range and each one of these involves many other 
issues. The last issue of course, is the issue of RSP’s.  RSPs and many other NGOs 
are targeting the poor. This paper has shown you the tip of the ice-berg on this issue. 
The real issue is whether RSPs and NGOs are actually targeting the poor?  In the 
work that we have done for the National Human Development Report, some 
important things have come out. In a sample of 40 you find half of the women are 
land owners, and the other 20 are potential land owners. We find that half of the 
people approximately, or more, are actually holders of irrigated acres. One of them 
has 200 irrigated acres, two of them have 70 and then 50 and 30.  I won’t go into 
what their presumptive incomes are, and these are the candidates for micro-credit. 
We must distinguish between micro-credit and poverty alleviation, they are two 
different things. In our sample now, and in previous work we have done over the 
years, I come across this again and again. One man with a marble factory who is also 
the ‘District Nazim; is getting the micro-credit. Let me also mention two best 
targeted micro-credit programmes I have seen ‘Kashaf’  and ‘Pyadar’. Now the 
results the impact, whether these loans have benefited or not is a separate matter. So 
what do we do about this? do we take the NGOs word for it—we are targeting the 
poor, or do we say no you are lying to us. We need to find a way of dealing with this 
problem at the macro-level, not targeting one or two organisations or types of 
organisations but across the board. I would suggest to you that we never take the 
government’s word for it, we insist on, as independent analysts, on verifying what 
the government says. So are NGOs sacred cows or do we verify what they tell us. 
One would really do this through independent surveys and studies to be carried out 
on repeat basis, but please even if we can carry them out on one time basis we can 
some things out of it.   How do we go about it? well one of the issues raised in the 
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last paper is the issue of, how do we define poverty. This issue is taken up in this 
paper and different approaches are given but it reminds me a bit about this man who 
went to Oxford in 1940s and who was American. He said, “when I left, my tutor said 
to me, what have you learnt here?” he said, I have learnt to see both side of the 
questions. The tutor said to him, I hope so learn to chose one. We need a mixture of 
income and consumption, to define poverty. I am as doubtful as the discussant in the 
previous paper on the value of using income data alone. We do need a consumption 
data but we need it at the micro-level. And we need to mediate it by any special 
circumstances that may exist in that area or in that region. For example, if a 
particular place, has high level of ill-health due to either nutrition or some form of 
industrial pollution, and we all know of such areas like Kasur or whether its parts of 
rural Balochistan, whatever, we need to factor that in, and it does not matter. If that 
factoring in cannot be done quantitatively, as long as you are analytically able to 
show that it exists. You won’t find that, one of the most distributing things I am 
seeing, is PRSP, which is the latest of the RSPs has no baseline data. I am sorry, this 
is not a sin of haste or omission, this is deliberate. We need that baseline data, we 
need to standardise that baseline data across NGOs, across organisations, across 
provinces, and we need to establish different baseline of different region because of 
the factors I mentioned to you earlier. It is not difficult or impossible to do at all. So 
there is your issue of poverty definition. Let us quickly move on to the programme 
sustainability. There was this whole era when we had subsidised credit and lots of it. 
Most of it went to the big landlords, and other needy people. But even for the poor 
you had subsidised credit to a small extent that you had it, that philosophy has 
changed. We cannot lend at those rates because such programme are not sustainable 
without large injunction of capital from some where usually the public exchequer. 
People of Pakistan as a whole borrow and pay through indirect taxation and 
somebody gets micro-credit at subsidised rates, I buy that problem. The next 
problem is, if your programme is going to be sustainable what kind of rate you are 
going to charge? Look at the case of Bangladesh where you have very large sections 
of population, being actually served by micro-credit and what do we see there: we 
see that the interest rates, the market interest rate has been lower than that of 
Pakistan. However, the effective interest rate charged to the borrowers has been in 
excess of 30 percent, the organisations giving the loans have gotten their own 
funding through such organisations like PKSF at very low, ridiculously low rate of 
interest themselves. So you’re subsidising the NGOs here. You are not subsiding the 
poor, you are subsidising NGOs, and believe me, and I feel that NGOs. should be 
declared an industry. This is very much the case in Pakistan as well, so if you are 
going to have sustainable programme in Pakistan what are you going to charge them, 
40 percent? and what have we been trying to sustain for heaven’s sake. What 
structure, are we trying to sustain. I am talking about Pajeeros here; I am talking 




account. For the question of the interest rates is there, I don’t see, we can make an 
argument for charging the poor more than market interest rates. I think, this is a 
question that we have to address very seriously. Let’s go on, to talk about the RSPs a 
point, we focused earlier on. A couple of corrections, the RSPs did not begin to work 
in 1995 and NRSP was not the first. I was one of the witnesses, so, I can tell you that 
first was NRSC now known as SRSP Sarhad Rural Support Programme, it has been 
working since 1989. NRSP did not start in 1995, it started in 1992 However small, 
but immediately thereafter it, got 500 million rupee endowment. Now if we look at 
the number of beneficiaries we did a calculation for this, for the NHTR as well. But 
we will take the figures given in this report we just talk about the micro-credit 
beneficiaries. 1.7 percent of the targeted poor are covered are in this period of time 
with the amount of fund that they have had so far. Look at their expenditure; an 
independent economist came up with the very conservative figures, which was 
nevertheless very high. This was violently objected to by the RSPs. But I will say 
this that if you wanted to cover all of the rural areas you would need the entire 
Pakistan budget every year and what’s more given the amount of time we have 
spoken of and the coverage to date, the period of time required, would be greater 
than the Mughal Empire.  So far the Pakistan’s Poverty Elevation Fund show that 91 
percent of all the funding given under various heads, went to two organisations both 
RSPs. AKRSP which we have always been told has masses of funds lying in its 
accounts because of the savings of its members which the bank was lending to rich 
and not back to them. Apparently, now 20 years later on they have come up with 
something new, heaven help us! The other one was NRSP, which was taking 59 
percent. So, are we to imagine that 91 percent of the work in the micro-credit in 
Pakistan is being done by two agencies. This is a very serious problem and its 
coupled with an attitude that comes across all the time we are doing the right work 
and nobody else deserves even a crumb. I find this very disturbing. There are now a 
number of other issues which are more of a technical nature. We have discussed the 
interest rate issue, partly; there is the issue of savings. I disagree with the author on 
this. There are programmes that are successfully disbursing micro-credit with 
member’s savings and those who are doing without it. There is an argument to be 
made for savings when it comes to instilling credit discipline, but to use member’s 
savings to build-up the assets of the loaning agency or to link it with the amounts of 
loan that you are giving them. This whole business of lending without collateral, it is 
non-sense, that is what are talking about. So as usual poor are made to pay. Finally, a 
number of these organisations that are operating in this field they go into an area, 
they move-in with their infrastructure, which consists of large numbers of personal, 
buildings and all important vehicles which are a mark of status. What they don’t tell 
us is when they were going to move out, It is like a famous ‘Checkoslavakia  joke of 
1968. Why did the Russian’s come to Checosalvakia? To find out who invited them, 
when they are going to leave, when they found out. So we don’t know, nobody has 
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told us whether the RSPs  are going for one year, 5 years, 10 years or 20.  And other 
NGOs are in the same boat.  
We need some sort of the benchmark of maturity, Sorry, I said finally but 
there is one last point I would like to make. It concerns not methodology, it concerns 
the over all problem here which is: you are getting micro-credit in times of serious 
economic depression. Things have been bad since 1996, and things have been really 
bad since 1998 when the sanctions hit us, thanks to the aspirations of our Jahadi 
friends. And what’s happening is this:  micro-credit, when you target the poor with 
micro-credit you have the to target small amounts because that’s what they can 
repay. In times of need that’s going to be diverted towards consumption, there is no 
getting around that. You are dealing with the situation where people are literally 
using small amount of micro-credit to survive. Now if, it were times of growth, we 
have no problem, because work done by Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) and others have 
shown that returns to micro-enterprise are typically to the tune of 50 percent. But in 
times like this what we have seen and what our surveys recently for NHTR have 
shown, major employment, underemployment, major instances of people not being 
paid for the labour that they do. This whole issue of doing handicrafts, I have strong 
reservations about that. I find women being paid Rs 200 to Rs 300 a month if that, 
and that they don’t get to pocket that either. This is a kind of thing, which is going 
on. So we need to look at what happens to micro-credit in times of economic 
depression. It is not a bad thing if you are helping people to keep their heads above 
the water, but how long can you keep that up. And finally, finally you have seen 
whether its RSPs or any other organisations just how much they been able to cover. 
We cannot right-off the government. Government may have written itself off, but we 
cannot right it off. They have most funding, they have the most money, they have the 
biggest presence and they have damn-well got to produce, they have got to do some 
thing if this country is to go anywhere. 
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